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Abstract
Simply by using information technology, consumers expose
themselves to considerable security risks. Because no tech-
nical or legal solutions are readily available, the only remedy
is to develop a risk management process for consumers, sim-
ilar to the process executed by enterprises. Consumers need
to consider the risks in a structured way, and take action,
not once, but iteratively. Such a process is feasible: enter-
prises already execute such processes, and time-saving tools
can support the consumer in her own process. In fact, given
our society’s emphasis on individual responsibilities, skills
and devices, a risk management process for consumers is
the logical next step in improving information security.
1. INTRODUCTION
As consumers’ lives are revolving more and more around
IT, they are facing serious security and privacy risks. But in
spite of this, consumers are incapable of securing themselves.
They forget to make regular backups, do not check their
online banks statements and put very sensitive data on social
networking sites.
At the same time, consumers are overwhelmed by well-intended
advice and tools that can supposedly remedy their problems.
Microsoft offers free anti-virus, the New York Times offers a
three-step remedy for Facebook privacy, governments spend
a great amount of money on increasing consumer ’aware-
ness’, Apple sells dedicated devices for backups, and the
open source community develops software to help consumers
manage their passwords.
Unfortunately, implementing, or even finding all such advice
and tools would likely take more time every day than the
average person is on-line. Worse, there is no proof that
these ’solutions’ actually work, and they will certainly not
work in the near future, as consumers’ use different systems
and applications from day to day, and new threats emerge.
As a consequence, consumers will either spend too much or
too little time on security, erring on the side of too little,
and their effort is ill-focused, as they do not oversee the
entire range of options and do not understand the tradeoffs
involved.
I argue that what consumers need most urgently is a se-
curity process: they need a structured way of dealing with
the security risks they face. Executing this process is some-
thing that a government cannot do, and the government
cannot make it unnecessary either by privacy legislation or
consumer protection. Neither can businesses automate it
completely, as the process starts with the consumer’s own
objectives. Ultimately responsibility for security should be
placed into the hands of the consumers themselves: they
must be ’in control’ of their own IT devices, services and
data.
First, in Section 2, we discuss two of the myriad of problems
that consumers face, and why, in spite of advice and tools,
they are effectively not solved. Section 3 then analyzes the
problem and presents a solution, which is further elaborated
in Section 4 and 5. Section 6 shows how our solution can
work in practice, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. ’HELPING’ THE CONSUMER
In this section, I will discuss the problems that consumers1
are facing, to show why, in very simple cases, it is very diffi-
cult for consumers to get their security right. The first case
study concerns backups and archival, the second social net-
working sites. For each case, I briefly illustrate the security
problems that arise, and discuss some of the shortcomings
of available devices and the advice given. I do not intend
to be exhaustive, similar problems that consumers need to
deal with are abundant (consider securing USB sticks and
smartphones or managing passwords).
2.1 Backups and archival storage
Our first example concerns the availability of data: most
consumers want their data to be available when they need
it. The availability requirement relates to data that is in
active usage (for example recent email correspondence, the
kids’ homework assignments) and data that might be used
1I have chosen the word ’consumer’ for two reasons: first, I
wanted to set the persons (for whom the process is intended)
apart from enterprises: consumers do not have the resources
or the skills that an enterprise has. Second, I wanted to em-
phasize that the problems stem from consuming IT products
and services. With this in mind, the reader can substitute
’consumer’ with ’individual’ if she wishes.
later (vacation and wedding photos). With the many loca-
tions where data can be stored nowadays, both in the home
and on-line, it comes as no surprise that data is frequently
lost unintentionally [11]. Backups are often done ad hoc,
and most of the time consumers do not know what data is
archived where.
To ease archival and backups, many software applications
are available, and external storage devices provide an addi-
tional level of safety2. By connecting these devices to their
computer, backups can be made automatically.
However, it is questionable whether the goals of the user
are achieved: for example, is it actually her intention to
protect the data against calamities such as fire or theft? If
this is the case, then the external storage devices need to
be taken out of the home periodically, which would require
strict discipline and at least two storage devices to prevent
loss. Thus the user likely has a suboptimal solution.
If the consumer does not want to protect her data against
theft and fire, external storage devices can still protect against
hard disk failure, the likelihood of which is not readily known
when buying a computer. In other cases, a digital ‘dust-
bin’ helps best to retrieve documents that were accidentally
deleted. Again, the user’s choice of a backup solution is
likely to be suboptimal.
The most reliable option for availability purposes might be
remote on-line storage. However, this also costs more than
storage in the home, especially for large scale archival stor-
age. Thus, for an optimal choice, the user needs to be certain
that she intends to secure herself against threats such as fire
and theft, and knows the cost of these solutions.
The complexity of making the right choice for backups in-
creases when we consider that a consumer has many de-
vices, ranging from laptops to music players, smartphones
and USB sticks. Ensuring the availability of all this data
requires a backup and archival plan for all of these, and the
understanding of the synchronization features that are of-
fered by software, and the risks that come along with these.
Worse, much of the consumer’s data is stored in the cloud.
Should the user now backup data from the cloud onto her
laptop? She does not know what the capabilities are of
those cloud providers in terms of availability, and again is
thus likely to make a suboptimal choice (or make no choice
at all).
2.2 Social network sites
Our second example is about privacy on social network sites.
By their very nature, sites such as Facebook contain per-
sonal identifiable information, often of a very private na-
ture. This leads to many risks, including job loss, simply
being embarrassed, blackmailed [8] or having one’s identity
stolen [2]. Privacy advocating organizations such as the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have come in very
hard on these issues, to ensure that enterprises protect the
privacy of their users. The media follow these battles with
interest and regularly publish information intended to rem-
2For example Microsoft’s Windows Live OneCare Backup
and Restore, and Apple’s Time Machine and Time Capsule
edy the situation. For example, in January 2010, the New
York Times published an advisory concerning Facebook pri-
vacy settings [12]. Facebook also continues to introduce new
features and new types of privacy controls, so the consumer
has to keep reading the news to find what new rules and set-
tings she should apply. The most recent example in April
2010 concerns a new service called ’instant personalization’,
which allows users to share information with other web-
sites [13] by default. Thus she is likely to end up exposing
herself more than she intends.
In fact, the situation is worse, as a consumer’s privacy does
not depend on only herself, but on many others: this is in-
herent to the social network infrastructure that has been
built. A user can try to secure her own profile, but as long
as other people upload pictures and make them available
publicly, she will not achieve the goal of guarding her pri-
vacy.
In the mean time, researchers are developing tools to shield
data on social network sites from others: for example Face-
cloak encrypts data on Facebook to improve user privacy [10].
However, although technically sound, such tools need to be
in widespread usage to be effective: anyone using them will
spend an unreasonable amount of time on implementing it
and making sure their friends use it too. If the consumer
is seriously concerned about privacy, the best advice might
be to simply stop using Facebook. Whether this is a good
advice depends on the tradeoffs the user makes between the
social functions that Facebook offers and the consequential
loss of privacy. However, the consumer does not know how
to make this tradeoff, as it is beyond the scope of any advice
or tool created.
2.3 Evaluation
Our two samples of IT usage show that even in very com-
mon cases, which millions of consumers face, consumers will
be unable to secure themselves efficiently. In the case of
backups, a vendor tries to sell a product that only partially
solves the probable goal that the user has. In the case of so-
cial network sites, we see that solutions are ad hoc; making
it likely that in the future the consumer will have lower pro-
tection, unless magically, she stumbles upon a new piece of
advice that guides her in the right direction. Thus, the con-
sumer’s security situation is suboptimal, not only for these
cases, but likely concerning her entire usage of IT.
3. PROBLEM ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION
From the case studies in the previous section, we learn that
consumer security is neither very effectively nor efficient. We
will now summarize the main problems in Section 3.1 and
show how we can learn from enterprises in Section 3.2.
3.1 Consumers need a security process
First, consumers need to state their goals explicitly, what
they actually wish to achieve. As consumers do not start out
by setting specific security goals, they cannot make informed
decisions and live up to them, so that they have a decent
strategy for their backups or for guarding their privacy.
Second, if the consumer decides whether to use an applica-
tion, the consequences should be clear: what are the trade-
offs involved, for example in terms of money and privacy?
This involves also risk management, assessing how likely cer-
tain threats are against assets, and what can be done to
mitigate them.
Third, securing IT is essentially a cyclic process. Checklists
have to be executed periodically because
• new technology is introduced
• security processes degrade over time
• the consumer’s own goals change
Each change requires a re-evaluation of the situation. Com-
bined, the central thesis of this paper is that
consumers need a goal-driven, cyclic security process to make
risk assessments. Until this process is in place, all other at-
tempts at securing consumers will fall far short.
3.2 The enterprise security process
Having stated the requirements for a consumer security in
the previous section, the question can be posed how likely it
is that these requirements can be realized. In this context,
we examine the enterprise security process, which demon-
strates that in another context, such requirements are al-
ready fulfilled: there are methods to implement a goal-driven,
cyclic security process to make risk assessments.
Concerning the goals, the governance structure of enter-
prises is laid out in frameworks such as COSO3. Business
goals are determined by the CEO, and the CIO (Chief In-
formation Officer) and CSO (Chief Security Officer) trans-
late business requirements into IT and security goals, and fi-
nally into policies, choosing the most effective security mech-
anisms, in the context of a security program.
ISO 27001 specifies how an Information Security Manage-
ment System (ISMS) can be implemented [7]. This ’system’
is actually a cyclic security process, consisting of four phases:
1. Plan (establish the process)
2. Do (implement and operate the process)
3. Check (monitor and review the process)
4. Act (maintain and improve the process)
Risk assessment is part of the establishment and manage-
ment of the ISMS process. First the enterprise sets criteria
for how much risk the company in general is willing to take,
the ’risk appetite’. Next, risk identification is performed: a
risk assessment team considers the threats to company as-
sets. The risks are analyzed and options for risk treatment
considered. In general, four options exist to treat risks:
1. Accept (do nothing)
2. Transfer (for example buy insurance)
3. Mitigate (put security controls in place)
3http://www.coso.org/
4. Avoid (discontinue the activity)
Note that there is no normative judgment involved: taking
less risk is not necessarily bad, as spending too many re-
sources on security will neither benefit customers nor share-
holders.
In essence, such a process should be available for consumers
as well. Therefore, in order to solve the consumer security
problem, consumers will have to adopt a framework similar
to that of ISO 27001, but sufficiently simple so that it can
be executed by a non-skilled person, in limited time.
4. COUNTERARGUMENTS
We will now discuss several counterarguments for our thesis
that consumers will benefit from executing a security pro-
cess, and are capable of executing it.
4.1 Consumers do not know what they want
In an enterprise, success is definable by monetary loss or
profit, and a business can relate its security mechanisms to
these goals, to determine how much effort should be spent
on security. However consumers, especially in their private
life, do not have clearly defined goals, and hence it is not
clear what mechanisms they should put in place and at what
cost [14]. Furthermore, there is doubt about whether con-
sumers actually have stable privacy preferences [1].
Response. Consumers also know what they do not want:
consumers can be shown a list of risks, and they choose
whether they wish to avoid them: whether they want to run
the risk of losing their job because of Facebook, or accept
the loss of data in case of a fire. Tools and techniques to
elicit security and privacy goals are available [9]. Further-
more, changes are expected, the cyclic nature of the process
allows (or even invites) consumers to alter their policies be-
cause of actual changes or simply because they view privacy
differently.
4.2 Consumers do not think, they do
In an enterprise, security is institutionalized: employees per-
form different functions, check the performance of others’,
and guard their part of the process. A CSO has a real re-
sponsibility; she can be fired if too many incidents occur. For
a consumer, security will always be a secondary objective,
and she cannot be fired or replaced. Furthermore, this insti-
tutionalization slows down changes and this latency can be
considered a good thing: an organization with good security
policies cannot lose them overnight. Oppositely, consumers
act very fast, they can decide in 20 minutes to buy a new
computer and start using it immediately, without any for-
mal process taking place. Creating a new Facebook account
takes even less time.
Response. Indeed, consumers act faster and have less in-
terest, but many processes can be automated as we will see
in Section 5. Furthermore, the cyclic nature of the process
(plan-do-check-act) makes it possible to detect violations of
policies and correct them afterwards, limiting the impact.
4.3 Consumers do not want to spend time on
security
Ultimately, security and privacy is of little value to con-
sumers, and this is why many consumers refuse to put in
more effort. For example, according to one calculation, given
the likelihood of phishing (resulting in fraud) efforts to pre-
vent it should not take more than a second a day [6] to be
economically feasible.
Response. The security process must become an integrated
part of what people do. Taking care of one’s security can
become something similar to mowing one’s lawn, or cleaning
up one’s home: no one questions the economic value of these
activities, they have to be done. Currently the lack of se-
curity is not visible, but once others take notice, consumers
will make sure that it is in order. It can also be argued
that consumers will spend certainly less time than enter-
prises: they do not own large IT infrastructures comprising
hundreds of servers, where the likelihood must be estimated
that attackers will move from node to node in a long multi-
step attack [4]. For consumers, a cloud computing service
can simply be considered as a black box. However, it is
unquestionably true that there is a bootstrapping problem.
4.4 Consumers are stupid
Consumers do not have any expertise in risk assessments,
and especially people with little education will not be able
to execute a whole risk assessment process.
Response. Many parts of the process can be automated,
and there is no requirement for understanding everything
into detail. Some things are naturally complicated, but con-
sumers are free to spend time as they see fit. If someone
chooses to spend less time on learning her security process,
she will likely have less security, but maybe this is the most
ideal situation, the optimal tradeoff between effort and re-
sult. In an enterprise context of managing IT, maturity
models are used (such as for CObIT4) for this purpose. A-
priori, there is nothing wrong with being at a low maturity
level - but consumers should nevertheless make a conscious
decision about their security - and do this repeatedly, start-
ing with their security goals.
4.5 A consumer security process will stifle in-
novation
If users have to consider security before signing up to a new
service, they will never use it, and there will be no new An-
droid, Twitter or iPhone, and consumers will be ultimately
worse off in terms of security.
Response. If the new service offers security guarantees from
the start, it will even improve adoption. Rather than stifling
innovation, a consumer security process will spawn many
new areas of research, and provide many opportunities to
innovate. In fact, users will be able to use more products
and more securely, not being held back by worries about
their security.
4http://www.isaca.org/cobit/
5. TOWARDS A PERSONAL CHIEF SECU-
RITY OFFICER
After having discussed and rejected several counterarguments
in Section 4 we now focus on envisioning an actual solu-
tion. We call the tool the ’personal Chief Security Officer’
(pCSO), and its features are explained next. Figure 1 shows
the tool in its context.
5.1 Core functionality
The core of the pCSO consists of three main components,
with which the consumer interacts.
First, a wizard helps consumers to configure their security
process easily. It takes consumers through a series of steps,
defining the devices and data they have, their security goals
and informs them about the threats they have.
Second, a scheduler will contact the user at regular intervals,
to assess whether any changes have taken place, which need
to be taken into account. If necessary, this leads to a task
for the user, for which the wizard is invoked.
Third, the pCSO offers a dashboard, providing a status overview
of the entire IT infrastructure that someone has, the risk
exposures, deficiencies and points of attention. Opposite of
other privacy dashboards such as offered by Google5, the
pCSO dashboard aggregates information from all applica-
tions and systems the consumer is using, not just from one
vendor. Here, the user can see which applications she is
using, what devices she has, and what actions need to be
taken. Part of the status overview is an indication of how
well the user is managing her security. The dashboard shows
information about all security properties: confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability.
5.2 Shared data
Although the pCSO is intended to be used as an individual
tool, data can (and should) be shared, to execute the se-
curity process effectively. A central repository can contain
frequently used data, which consumers do not have to invent
themselves:
• Security goals, such as keeping one’s job.
• Devices, similar to an infrastructure library, for exam-
ple listing all the iPhone models.
• Software catalogue, containing widely used software,
with features and configurations, for example all Win-
dows versions.
• Attacks and mitigations, for example risks relating to
identity theft.
Such databases already exist for commercial purposes, for
example the CRAMM methodology (in use by NATO), has
an extensive database of security controls6. The pCSO li-
brary can be maintained in a collaborative effort by con-
sumers, enterprises and security researchers.
5http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/
transparency-choice-and-control-now.html
6http://www.cramm.com/capabilities/controls.htm
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Figure 1: The personal Chief Security Officer in context
It should also be possible to share risk assessment results be-
tween users: data gathered by the pCSO can be passed on
to others, proving that a person has spent effort on main-
taining her security posture, possibly even demonstrating
compliance with certain regulations, which is needed in a
business environment (for example when working as a free-
lancer).
5.3 Interoperability with applications
Interoperability with other applications can make the pro-
cess work faster and easier. For example logging into a social
network service can automatically trigger an event that this
particular application is used, and alert the consumer of ac-
tions that she needs to take. Oppositely, the consumer’s
policies might be such that the usage of the application is
simply in violation of her own security policies: she is given
the choice between either changing her policies or abandon-
ing the intent of using the application. This approach could
make use of the previously developed Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P) by the W3C7, which allows browsers to
process website’s privacy policies automatically.
6. REALLY HELPING THE CONSUMER
To illustrate how the pCSO will work in practice, we will
return to the cases of Section 2, and show how a pCSO
would give consumers more control over her security, and
likely improve her security posture. First Alice uses the
pCSO for ensuring data availability, second Bob manages
his privacy with the pCSO.
6.1 Backups and archival storage
Alice enlists her laptop in the pCSO through the wizard.
She clicks the types of data that she has (personal and work
emails, photos, movies), and determines the risks she is will-
ing to take: she accepts the loss of data during travel, but
wants to have a backup in case of fire. (The pCSO informs
7www.w3.org/standards/techs/p3p\#w3c_all
her of the likelihood of a disk crash, using the laptop’s man-
ufacturer and serial number.) Next, she buys two external
storage devices; one is located in her home, and one in her of-
fice. Every two weeks, the pCSO gives a reminder that the
devices need to be swapped, after which she initiates the
backups. After two months, she buys a new smartphone,
which she registers in the pCSO. The dashboard now shows
that she has not defined the policies for this phone and the
data residing on it: she registers that the smartphone syn-
chronizes with the laptop, and that the laptop is the master
copy, from which she will be making backups. Working with
the pCSO in this way, Alice feels confident that here data is
secured and will be secured in the future.
6.2 Social network sites
Bob starts by enlisting his goals. Since Bob has a high profile
and very visible job position, the pCSO warns him exten-
sively of the risks that he runs by using the social network
site - not only now but also in the decades to come. Based on
this consideration, Bob decides to keep a minimum profile,
not uploading any pictures. Every month, the pCSO re-
minds him to check whether he has been ’tagged’ in photos,
after which he can take action (have the pictures removed).
After a while, Alice wishes to become Bob’s friend on the
site. Before accepting her, he investigates her security pos-
ture: as she is using the pCSO with certain privacy policies,
he asks for her status report, so that he can assert that she
will take his privacy seriously. She sends the report by the
pCSO and he accepts her request. A week later, the net-
working site changes its policies. Many pCSO users notice
this change, and an advisory is created in the shared library.
As Bob is a user of the site, it pops up on his computer, and
instructs him how to deal with the change, keeping in line
with his own policies. Thus, Bob is assured that he has done
the right steps to prevent damage to his career.
7. CONCLUSION
If someone would audit consumers, they would not be ’in
control’ of their assets, with unknown, but likely dire con-
sequences for their own security, and that of their friends,
family and business relations. In this paper, I have argued
that the one thing that can improve information security in
the short term is to develop a security process for consumers,
such that they can regain control. Technical solutions to se-
curity such as privacy-enhancing techniques are not readily
in use, and little can be expected from changes in laws and
regulations; the only immediate thing that can be done, is to
give consumers the tools for doing risk assessments, accept-
ing the existing infrastructure as a given. All the resources
spent on raising ’awareness’ are more effectively spent on
creating this process, because arguably, the process is the
necessary precondition for sufficient awareness, and not the
consequence.
Realizing a consumer security process will not be an easy
task, but it is feasible, and it will be worth the effort. As the
investigation of enterprise security has shown, many parts
of the solution already exist, and can be adapted for con-
sumers.
There is no one better suitable for securing her assets than
the consumer herself: she has the best knowledge about her
own situation, and the best motivation. With the trend of
consumers working on their own devices (opposite of having
shared computers), a consumer security process is the logical
next thing to be developed: Everyone has to manage the
security of her own ’lifestream’, the time-ordered stream of
documents that is created in the process of her life [5].8
Furthermore, with the every increasing workforce of inde-
pendent contractors and freelancers, it does not suffice - even
for enterprises - to focus on enterprise security. If the free-
lancer’s Blackberry is not secured, it is not only her own
shop that is at risk, but also the enterprise’s that hires her.
In the near future IT will not only affect our digital (or so-
cial) security, but also our physical environment: the smart
homes of the future will be equipped with medical devices,
digital door locks and smart energy meters. Without a pro-
cess in place to manage this abundance of IT, the consumer
will not have control anymore.
Developing the tools to support this process will not only
have a direct impact on individual’s and enterprise’s secu-
rity, but more importantly, it will be a catalyst for the de-
velopment of new devices and software: as it makes people
conscious of the shortcomings of existing solutions. Thus,
although our future will be filled with devices and software,
we will be better equipped for dealing with them.
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